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FROM THE ENERGY CRISIS TO THE CONCEPT OF AN
ECONOMIC HERITAGE OF MANKIND: GUIDELINES
FOR REORGANIZING THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC SYSTEM
FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUNA*
Many problems have shaken the international economic system
in recent years. These problems have demonstrated the in-
adequacy of that system to meet the need of the contemporary
international community in its complex political, social, cultural,
and economic dimensions. The ups and downs of the monetary
crisis, for example, have altered international trade; the energy
crisis showed the enormity of the problem. Still more significant
is the unstable relationship between different economic blocks,
and the most unsatisfactory treatment that the problems of
developing countries have received, both of which threaten to
project the current partial, sectorial or transitory crisis into a
generalized disruption of unpredictable consequences.
Historically, the reaction to these problems has been to seek
partial solutions. Solutions have been ad hoc and limited to the
sector in which the problem arose. Examples of this approach
are (1) the creation of special drawing rights whbich was limited
to solving problems of liquidity and pressures in the balance of
payments;' (2) the initiatives to reform the international mone-
tary system which bore no obvious relationship to reform of the
system of international trade;2 (3) the reform of the GATT,
which was apparently aimed at strengthening the already
dominant position of developed countries; 3 and (4) the estab-
lishment of a preference mechanism which was based on the
mistaken belief that it would solve the problems and needs of
developing countries.4
*Director of Studies and Professor of International Law, Institute of International
Studies, The University of Chile, Santiago. The views expressed in this article are exclu-
sively those of the author.
I For the background on the creation of special drawing rights and their objectives, see J.
GOLD, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS: CHARACTER AND USE (IMF Pamphlet No. 13, 2d ed. 1970).
I Concerning the need for a close relationship between monetary and trade negotiations.
see G. Erb, New Trade and Monetary Systems. THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEVELOPING
WORLD: AGENDA FOR ACTION 31-34 (1973) (hereinafter cited as AGENDA). Developing coun-
tries have continually insisted on such a relationship, see, e.g., the "Quito Appraisal," Latin
America and International Development Strategy: First Regional Appraisal, 55 U.N.
ECOSOC, Supp. 8, Vol. 1, at 89. U.N. Doc. E/5275 E/CN.12/958/Rev. 1 (1973), particu-
larly the sections approved by ECOSOC Res. 320(XV). Id. at 88.
2 Developing countries have noted that the multilateral trade negotiations of 1973 have
not been adequately directed to their problems. See, ECOSOC Res. 326(XV). Id. at 129.
, Although the systems of preferences enacted by the EC, Japan and the United States
(the new U.S. law may be founu in Trade Act of 1974, §1 501-505, 88 Stat. 2066) repre-
sent positive steps toward encoui igement of the export of manufactures and semi-manu-
factures by developing countrie4, additional measures are also required for them to make
full use of the potentialities of preferential systems. See AGENDA, supra note 2, at 35-37.
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Whatever value these mechanisms might have, the fact that
they were conceived as partial solutions accounts for their in-
ability to solve the basic problems of the international economic
system as a whole. The most basic problems are caused by the
underlying economic principles of the Bretton Woods agreements
and the economic scheme of the nineteenth century. These prin-
ciples and their corresponding legal instruments have lost their
raison d'etre and their operational effectiveness, and will eventu-
ally lose their legitimacy in an international community which
is radically different from that from which they arose. There-
fore, any permanent solution must be global. In particular, it
must provide for full participation by developing countries
whose presence is the fundamental change in the international
community.
The purpose of th.is study is to examine the causes of obso-
lescence of the present international system and to suggest a
basis upon which a general reform of the international economy
might eventually rest.
1. The outcome of ucontrolled economic freedom
The basic principle which guided the classic economic struc-
ture, as established in the nineteenth century, was a free market
and the international division of labor, implemented by means
of the most-favoured-nation treaty5 Theoretically, identical or
equivalent advantages would derive from this system for all
countries, as determined by comparative advantages, freedom
of competition, equal access to markets, and nondiscrimination.
However, theory was strongly contradicted by practice.
The classic system entirely disregarded the fact that different
levels of development meant a different capacity to take ad-
vantage of international markets.
While countries that were industrially, politically, and mili-
tarily powerful had every advantage in international markets,
beginming with free access to raw materials and culminating
with ample placement of industrial goods, other countries with
little or no industrialization were limited to a flow of trade, the
terms of which could become more unfavorable with every
passing year, and which would be of little significance as a
stimulus to their domestic development. The well-known phe-
nomenon today in international trade of developing countries
acting as suppliers of raw materials to developed countries and
importers of industrial goods therefrom has resulted in a re-
For an analysis of the operation of the most-favored-nation clause in the classic system
with particular reference to Latin America, sec generally, AMERICA LATINA Y LA CLAUSULA
PE LA NACION MAS FAVORECIDA (F. Orrego Vicuna -d. 1972).
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lationship which is formally different but substantially identical
to that which existed under colonial domination. 6
Several factors reinforced this relationship. One of them was
the belief that raw materials, including the resources of the sea,
were inexhaustible; this caused them to be assigned reduced
values, and seriously depressed prices. Another factor was that
the developing countries seldom accurately perceived the conse-
quences of the relationship's operation.7 Developed countries,
however, clearly perceived the advantages and disadvantages in-
volved. This is evidenced by the fact that they originally indus-
trialized while protecting their national economies. Only when
these economies matured did they then adhere to the rules of
free trade in order to assure their position in the international
economic system.8 This perception greatly helped them to direct
and influence the operation of the market, thereby insuring
favorable conditions for their prosperity.
In short, the working of the system of uncontrolled economic
freedom generated entirely different results for industrialized
and developing countries. The industrialized countries were
guaranteed freedom of access to raw materials, either by means
of their own policies of foreign investment or by means of the
simple purchase of the only goods that developing countries were
in a position to produce, all of it at minimum prices. At the same
time, the nondiscriminatory placement of their industrial pro-
duction in the international market was also guaranteed, either
by means of the protection granted by most-favored-nation
clauses or, when required, by force of arms. For developing
countries, the system meant the impossibility of creating an
efficient industrial base of their own. Furthermore, the system
failed to guarantee the developing nations nondiscriminatory
access to the markets of industrialized countries since in prac-
tice these countries were free to enact discriminatory procedures
and mechanisms even regarding certain raw materials in which
they had little interest.
The outcome of this process was an enormous concentration
of wealth and economic power in industrialized countries, as well
s In 1969, commodities represented 23.2% of the exports of developed market economy
countries while manufactures represented 76.9% of total exports. For developing countries,
these figures are reversed: commodities represented 76.2% of exports and manufactures
constituted 23.8%. For socialist countries, these figures were 35.7% and 64.3% respectively.
Id. at 127.
;However, a unique effort in this area was the Bello Clause, which strived to establish
a system of regional preferences among Latin American countries, the advantages of which
would not be enjoyed by third countries. It was an initiative which failed. See, F. Orrego
Vicuna, Estudio sobre la clausula Bello y la crisis de la solidaridad latinoamerica~na en el
siglo XIX, in AMERICA LATINA Y LA CLAUSULA DE LA NACION MAS FAVORECIDA 33-95 (F. Or-
rego Vicuna ed. 1972).
E.g., the United States only accepted unconditional most-favored-nation clauses in 1923;
see the instructions of Secretary of State Hughes to the U.S. diplomatic corps, 5 HACK-
woRTH 272 (1943).
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as the creation and progressive enlargement of the gap, which
continues to widen, between them and developing countries. 9
Such a result is inevitable when powerful and weak parties are
brought into a scheme of free competition, or, in other words,
when parties which are economically unequal have their rights
and obligations measured by equal legal standards. For this rea-
son, when a state builds its national economic system upon free-
dom of competition, it always introduces corrective mechanisms
directed to prevent adverse effects which otherwise would affect
the low-income groups of that society.1 0 However, none of these
corrective mechanisms exist in the international economic sys-
tem and their absence has been one of the causes of the present
economic crisis.
2. Bretton Woods: The Procedural Changes
The Bretton Woods agreements were the first attempt to re-
organize the international economic system. Their principal
concern was to reestablish the operation of the international
economy following the serious damage inflicted upon it by World
War II. Emphasis was placed on reconstruction, particularly
with regard to the industrialized countries affected by the war.
Having reconstruction as its principal purpose, the Bretton
Woods agreements never really questioned the foundations of the
international economic system, but were based upon principles
originating in the Nineteenth Century and were thereby in-
spired by the needs of the developed countries."
The principal change with regard to the scheme prevailing
before the war was only procedural: the creation of multilateral
mechanisms and institutions, which contrasted with the bilateral
techniques used in the pre-war period.12 If the meaning of the
new mechanisms is examined aside from procedural aspects, one
s The following figures are demonstrative of this gap:
Developing countries Developed countries
Gross product per capita $230 $3,085
Population (millions) 1,850 664
Literacy 40% 97%
Protein consumption (grams per person) 54/day 97/day
Calorie consumption 2,180/day 3,030/day
Life expectancy 52 yrs. 71 yrs.
Infant mortality (deaths per 1,000 110 21
live births)
Per capita power consumption 220 5,140(KWH per person per year)
Figures are from AGENDA, supra note 2, at 123.
10 Among such mechanisms, the following may be mentioned as examples: social legislation
to protect the weak from the powerful by application of unequal legal standards to parties
which are also economically unequal; prohibition of restrictive or discriminatory commercial
practices; and, the basic requirement of social coexistence, progressive redistribution of in-
come to avoid concentration of wealth and to satisfy elementary dictates of social justice.
UT. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, at 87, 39 (1969).
1In addition, multilateral negotiations reduced the opportunities of third country bene-
ficiaries of most-favored-nation clauses to freely take advantage of the concessions granted
in bilateral agreements. rd. at 40.
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realizes that the earlier situation was retained unchanged. First,
these mechanisms ensure the dominant position of industrialized
countries in the conduct of the system, both at the political level
and at the economic level, e.g., the voting arrangements in the
United Nations Security Council or decision-making in the
International Monetary Fund and in the World Bank.13 Second,
the nondiscriminatory access of industrial goods to the world
market is strengthened by the multilateral guarantee of the
most-favored-nation clause in the GATT and other tariff ar-
rangements. Third, the access to raw materials also continues
unchanged," with important flows of investment securing the
supply.13
The situation of developing countries in the system deteri-
orated. Prices and conditions of trade in raw materials became
less favorable to developing countries while prices of industrial
goods rose.' 6 Developing countries seeking access to world
markets for their production faced discrimination created not
only by non-tariff barriers but also by the multilateral nature of
the GATT.1 7 Within the GATT developing countries have been
kept in a peripheral position since they neither produce nor
consume the principal goods subject to tariff negotiations, and
they also do not enjoy the power of effective retaliation to pre-
vent the application of discriminatory measures. 8 Freedom of
competition was neither subject to corrections directed to prevent
adverse effects upon developing countries, nor was it tempered
by any effort to provide redistribution of income at the inter-
national level. International aid conformed to a concept of
charity rather than to a significant policy of stimulating de-
velopment, and it was often dispensed for political purposes; in
any event, it was insufficient.'
13 This results not only in the concentration of decision-making power in developed coun-
tries, but also in concrete economic consequences. An example is that developing countries
have only obtained 25% of the special drawing rights assigned to the members of the
International Monetary Fund, a proportion determined by their shares in this organization.
14 One of the principal objectives of the Atlantic Charter of August. 1941. that marked
the beginning of the postwar system, was ". . . to further the enjoyment by all states, great
or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade in the raw materials
of the world which are needed for the economic prosperity." J. JACKSON, supra note 10,
at 38.
15 The direct foreign investments of the United States in extractive activities increased
from 5.020 million dollars in 1951 to 15.212 million dollars in 1961; by 1971, they had
reached 30.978 million dollars. This represents a 203% increase for the 1951-1961 period,
and a 104% increase for the 1961-1971 period. See Lincoln Gordon, Multinational Corpora-
tions and the Less Developed Countries, in DUSSELDORF CONFERENCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL
CONTRtOL OF INVESTMENT 81 (1973).
16 On the problems affecting the trade of developing countries, see generally H. JOHNSON,
ECONOMIC POLICIgs TOWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1967).
d d. at 78-110.
"C. Lafer, El GATT, la clausula de la nacion mas favorecida y America Latina, AMERICA
LATINA Y LA CLAUSULA OR LA NACION MAs FAVORECIDA 123-148 (F. Orrego Vicuna ed.
1972). This study also demonstrates that the incorporation of Part IV in the GATT has, in
practice, had no influence whatsoever in the situation of developing countries.
.The net flow of official assistance from all developed, market-economy countries for
development has continuously decreased as measured by percentages of the gross national
product. In 1961, it represented 0.53t,: in 1971, it only represented 0.35%. AGENDA, saupra
note 2, at 1.R!9.
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The only mechanism of the postwar system which to some
extent was concerned with the situation of developing countries,
the Havana Charter and the proposed International Trade Or-
ganization, never came into being.20
The economic system described above inevitably led to a crisis
caused in part by the developing countries' search to achieve
equitable participation in the international economic order. Be-
fore examining further the stance which the Third World has
taken, some efforts which have sought to organize specific sectors
of the international economic system on grounds different from
the classic system will be examined.
3. The Search for Alternative Principles
The twentieth century has witnessed a number of efforts
directed at organizing given sectors upon principles different
from those which inspired the traditional economic system.
Some of the new mechanisms have departed from the rules of
market economies, while others have introduced differential
treatment in accordance with the various levels of economic
development of the parties involved.
State Trading
State trading was the first of the mechanisms to be applied.
Strictly speaking, such trading was not intended to regulate
international economic relations, but to organize the national
economy on the basis of state monopoly, whether total or partial.
However, since its effects were to close a given market and
prevent the free play of competition, it necessarily had strong
repercussions upon the development of international economic
relations, particularly with regard to the impossibility of ap-
plying the most-favored-nation clause within that market. For
this reason, countries that practice state trading normally have
organized their international transactions on a barter basis. A
consequence of this policy has generally been the nonparticipa-
tion of these countries in post war multilateral, mechanisms.
State trading has not provided solutions to the problems of
developing countries. A barter relationship, based on identical
treatment for the parties, prevents developing countries from
obtaining the preferential treatment required by their lesser
-0 The Havana Charter contained several chapters referring to "Employment and Eco-
nomic Activity," "Economic Development and Reconstruction," "Practices of Restrictive
.Negotiations," and "Intergovernmental Agreements on Basic Products" that GATT has
omitted. Proposals by Chile, Cuba, Brazil and India were directed to include a chapter on
cartels and regulation of services. Brazil and India also advocated strict control over quan-
titative restriction,. C Lafer. supra note 18. at 124-130.
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degree of economic development.2 I Also, state trading does not
guarantee nondiscriminatory access for products from devel-
oping countries into state controlled markets-in essence, it is a
discriminatory instrument.2  Furthermore, the operations of
state-owned enterprises in world markets display little or no
difference with those of multinational corporations (MNCs) .23
For the above reasons, state trading is not an alternative that
might overcome the substantive problems arising from the in-
ternational economic system, even though in given cases it may,
to some extent, improve the bargaining position of developing




To a degree, commodity agreements tend to bypass the prin-
ciple of freedom of competition and the laws of supply and
demand, while introducing some new approaches. These agree-
ments involve limited institutionalization in which both pro-
ducers and consumers of a given commodity meet in an effort to
satisfy their respective interests. A degree of planning is intro-
duced for this purpose, particularly with regard to volumes of
production and prices.25 Although, in theory, such agreements
should be mutually beneficial, realizing stable prices for pro-
ducers and regular supply for consumer countries, these results
have seldom been attained, particularly with respect to prices.
The reasons for failure are different with each agreement. In
the case of the International Coffee Agreement,26 for example,
the market is characterized by overproduction and undercon-
sumption, tending to depress prices. Since the product is not one
of vital interest for consumer countries, they are able to enjoy
an advantageous position from which they can control the oper-
ation of the system. In a context of pure supply and demand,
results would have probably been worse, but this should not
suggest that the agreement might be considered as a permanent
21 F. 0. Vicuna, El Comercio de Estado: Alternativa de la clausula de la nacion ma.
favorecida en la estructuracion del comercio internacional?, ENSAYOS SOERE DERECHO INTER-
NACIONAL ECONOXICO Volume II (F. 0. Vicuna ed.).
22 In 1970, the exports of developing countries to socialist countries represented only 5.8%
of their total exports. AGENDA, supra note 2, at 130.
23 During the discussions of Resolution 1721(LIII) of the United Nations Economic and
Social Council that called for the appointment of a group of experts to study the role of
multinational corporations, it was indicated that such study should not be limited to the
case of private corporations, but should also cover the public bodies operating in developing
countries. U.N. ECOSOC at 3, U.N. Doc. E/AC. 6/SR. 586 (1972) (Intervention by Mexi-
can delegate. M. Munos Laredo).
=4 F. Paolillo, El Comercio de Eatado: Altes-ativa posible de la clausula de la nacion snas
favorecida en la estructuraeion del comercio internacional, ENSAYOS SOBRE DERECHIO INTER-
NACIONAL ECONOMICO (F. 0. Vicuna ed.).
,On commodity agreements and other efforts of price stabilization, see H. JOHNSON,
supra note 16, at 136-162.
' C. Lafer, El Convenio Inlernecioal del Cafe. DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION 111-135
(1973).
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
solution. In other cases, such as that of the Wheat Agreement,2 7
although the original approach tended to depart from supply
and demand, developments have moved it towards greater free-
dom in the market. This has occurred because it was to the
advantage of developed countries, some of which are also major
wheat producers..2 s
Experience with commodity agreements reveals that they
temper the impact of the classic system, but cannot adequately
cope with its deficiencies. However, even assuming that such
agreements might constitute a feasible alternative, the problem
of their sectorial nature would still remain; i.e., even though eco-
nomic relations between developed and developing countries
might reach a perfect balance sector by sector, this would not be
a sufficient solution, for the developed countries would still enjoy
a dominant position over the whole, while a developing country
would be restricted to only the specific sector imposed by its
status as a monoproducer.'Hence, the approach of any serious
reorganization necessarily has to be global.
Trade Preferences
The third principal mechanism that has introduced new prin-
ciples is that of trade preferences.29 The most outstanding char-
acteristic of preferences is the recognition, as a basic principle,
of differential treatment in accordance with the degree of eco-
nomic development. Through the use of trade preferences less
developed nations are no longer subject in their trade to the
same rules applicable to industrialized countries. Industrialized
countries consent to be discriminated against in order to allow
special treatment for the industrial exports of developing coun-
tries. The economic inequality of the parties is regulated by legal
standards that are also unequal and to the benefit of the weaker
party, which will have its competitive capacity increased thereby.
This alone is an important development when compared with
the most-favored-nation clause, since the latter, as explained
above, subjects the parties to identical legal treatment in dis-
regard of their different levels of development.
To the extent that the developed country will be paying a
higher price than that which otherwise would have been paid in
a scheme of free competition, preferences allow the social in-
vestment needed to produce a given good to move from the de-
27 F. Paolillo, Los acuerdos internacionales sabre el trigo, ENSAYOS SOBER DERECHO INTER-
NACIONAL ECONOMICO (F. 0. Vicuna ed.).
28 Recently the United States has opted out of two other agreements oriented to regulate
price problems of sugar and cocoa. See AGENDA, supra note 2, at 37.
29 For a useful analysis of preferences in the perspective of the regulation of international
trade, see G. Verbit, Preferences and the Public Law of International Trade: The End of
the Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, 19-84 (1969).
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veloping country to the developed country granting the pref-
erence and accomplishing a degree of redistribution of income
at the international level.30 This is fundamentally different from
the system of "infant industry" protection, which was the great-
est concession allowed by the classic system to aid the indus-
trialization of developing areas, because the social investment is
not entirely borne by the developing country itself.:
Notwithstanding the importance of these principles, pref-
erences have not brought about a profound modification of the
international economic system. Their transitory scope does not
allow them to be considered as a permanent solution, and few
developing countries will be able to take full advantage of
them -. 3 Also, the system does nothing to alter the trend toward
higher prices for industrial goods which developing countries
must always import. The benefits arising from trade preferences
may be seriously eroded by continuing price increases of goods
from developed countries. Furthermore, the impact of foreign
investment policies on preference schemes must also be weighed,
particularly in light of the opportunities they may offer to
MNCs. 3s If, in addition, problems such as reciprocal preferences,
discrimination by regional blocks or by sectors, and the fact
that the controlling power of the system continues to be strongly
concentrated in developed countries, are all taken into account, it
is clear that preferences are still far from being a perfect
solution.4
Although none of the three mechanisms discussed above has
satisfactorily coped with the deficiencies of the classic system,
they have nonetheless introduced valuable principles into the
field, which if inserted in the proper framework, might become
important parts of a more lasting solution. All these principles
share a common departure from the scheme of unrestricted free
competition; but while some of them emphasize the conciliation
of the interest of producers and consumers by means of the
regulation of the market, others emphasize a different treatment
for different degrees of development, as well as the international
redistribution of income. There are, moreover, two fundamental
factors which also point to the need for a general reorganization
30 Id. 32-33.
31 H. JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 181.
12 For this reason, it has been proposed that the scheme of preferences be accompanied
by other additional measures directed to increase the competitive capacity of developing
countries. See AGENDA, supra note 2, at 36.
23 Preferences may determine a transfer of industrial production from developed to de-
veloping countries in order to take advantage of the greater margin of competitiveness
enjoyed by the benefited country; such transfers are greatly facilitated by the international
mobility of capital, technology, and management capacity. See JOHNSON, supra note 16, at
194-195.
34 For an examination of the arguments related to the advantages and disadvantages of
preferences, see id. at 164-206.
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of the present international economic order: the impact of
multinational corporations in the traditional system, and the
pressure of a third world organized as a group.
4. The Multivational Corporations: The Classic System
Questioned by Developed Countries
The classic economic system gave birth to MNCs which have
attained a high degree of development during the post war
period under the Bretton Woods agreements. Favorable condi-
tions for their development were provided, on the one hand, by
the principles of a free international market and of unrestricted
freedom of competition, and, on the other hand, by spectacular
increases in foreign private investment, which were the conse-
quence of the enormous concentration of capital that developed
countries obtained through the benefits arising from the opera-
tion of that system.35
MNCs have clearly been faithful to the principles supporting
the classic system: (1) they operate in the international market
in accordance with the rules of comparative advantage and in-
ternational division of labor, (2) they are based on and require
free movement of capital, goods, and services, (3) they guaran-
tee the nondiscriminatory access of industrial goods and tech-
nology to the international market, and (4) they have also as-
sured, in many cases, the free access by developed countries to
the raw materials of the developing world.
However, as MNCs developed, the magnitude of their impact
on the very same international system was startling. The
enormous volume of trade, investment and production concen-
.trated in their hands,3 in addition to operating with great flex-
ibility in many countries, 37 not only transformed them into
powerful economic forces, but also facilitated the process leading
toward the achievement of autonomy from the nation-state.38
Even though the different components of the MNCs might be
3 Between 1960 and 1971, the book value of the direct foreign investments of the United
States rose from 33 to 86 billion dollars; Great Britain doubled its investments, 12 to 24
billion dollars; Japan increased its investments by 15 times, 300 million to 4.5 billion dollars;
Germany had an increase of ten times. United Nations: Multinational Corporations in
World Development, U.N. Doe. ST/ECA/190, at 8 (1973).
aG International production, that is, the production subject to foreign control or decision,
has been estimated for 1971 to have been 330 billion dollars, and according to other calcula-
tions, it could be as high as 450 billion dollars; in any case, it is already larger than the
total exports of market economy countries which reached 310 billion dollars. Id. 14. It
has also been estimated that in the 1980's, 75% of world trade and industrial production
will be concentrated in the hands of 300 multinational corporations. Vagts, The Global Cor-
poration and International Law, 6 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 249
(1972).
7 The United States and Western Europe have 7.276 parent corporations, with a minimum
of 27.300 subsidiaries abroad. 3.357 parent companies have subsidiaries in one foreign coun-
try; 3.241 have subsidiaries in 2-9 countries; 501 have subsidiaries in 10-19 countries; and
177 have subsidiaries in 20 or more countries. U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190, supra note 35, at 121.
38 See generally R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S.
ENTERPRISES (1971).
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physically located in given countries, the corporation as a whole
has come to be guided by its own interests and policies, often
different from those of the states in which it operates.
In many cases, the MNC's international mobility has allowed
it to work simultaneously in different markets as a producer and
as a consumer. It may produce raw materials in a developing
country and consume them in a developed country, always ap-
plying the principle of comparative advantage although it would
be no longer measured in terms of the interest of one country
vis a vis another, but in terms of the strategy of production of a
single entity. This has allowed the MNC to work either in con-
junction with the interests of developed or developing countries,
as dictated by its own interests in a given situation. 39 Other
factors, such as technological development, transfer pricing, or
restrictions imposed by the MNC on the local activities of its
components, reveal that this unitary structure has surpassed
traditional political frontiers.40 However great might have been
the impact of this phenomenon in developing countries, it has
been even greater in developed countries, for the size of their
markets, their consuming capacity and their abundance of capi-
tal constitute the natural framework for the action of entities
the size of MNCs.
In the developed countries questioning of the merits of the
international division of labor and of the uncontrolled freedom
of the international market has begun in response to among
other things: 1) realization of the difficulties, and occasionally
the impossibility, of controlling the operations of MNCs, 2) the
effects of foreign investments on developed countries' balance
of payments situations, 3) rivalry between the industrial ca-
pacity of developed countries and that which developed country
corporations have built abroad, 4) effects on domestic labor
forces of MNCs' recourse to cheaper labor abroad, 5) negative
trade balances, 6) speculative dealings by MNCs in national cur-
rencies, 7) complication of international political relations due
to the policies of MNCs in foreign countries, 8) the menace posed
by the energy crisis to the survival of developed countries as
industrial societies, and 9) the performance of the major oil
companies during the energy crisis.41 The reaction of developed
countries is still in its initial stages. So far it has mainly con-
sisted of measures to protect the balance of payments, and
other supporting actions in related areas. Also, numerous pro-
=o The effects of multinationa, activjtie . -, i,,ternational trade have been major, see U.N.
Dec. ST/ECA.,"90. supra ,ote 5 Nt 63-64.
Id. 39.
For a summary of the proiolems pro\.,s k by multinational corpurations in their home
C-ontries, see ;d. at 56-57.
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posals have been put forward concerning extraterritorial appli-
cation of regulations, corporate behavior codes, disclosure of
information, procedures for consultation and negotiation, and
other initiatives, none of which has gone to the heart of the
problem. 42 In fact, the dimensions of the problem only recently
have begun to be appreciated, and there are no clear approaches
yet on how to solve it.
Attention has been primarily directed at the MNCs, and they
have been blamed for all of the adverse effects arising from the
international economic system. However, such an approach is
both limited and unjust. As was stated above, MNCs have been
faithful to the principles of the classic system, and have per-
fected their operations within it. Therefore, the solution is not to
control solely what is a manifestation of the problem, but to
deal with the problem itself, i.e., to reorganize the principles
which guide that system, so that not only a single manifestation
such as the MNC will come under control, but to insure that a
large number of other undesirable phenomena will be prevented.
In any case, the impact of MNCs has provoked the first efforts
of developed countries to come to terms with some of the defi-
ciencies of the classic system.
5. The Consolidation of the Third World: The Power to
Press Claims
The postwar period also has witnessed a gradual acquaintance
of developing countries with the real meaning of the inter-
national economic system. The first systematic efforts to correct
the disadvantages of developing countries were formulated at
the Havana Charter discussions. 43 What in the beginning was
the position of a limited number of countries from Latin America
and Asia gradually became the common conception of a large
amalgam of countries which gained independence as a result of
decolonization. Also, claims originally relating only to specific
problems of international trade gradually encompassed the
whole of commercial policies, foreign investment, maritime re-
sources, and many other fields, leading to an overall questioning
of the international economic system.
The process of institutional consolidation of the Third World
has significantly accelerated in the last decade. Through the first
joint actions in the United Nations General Assembly, character-
ized more by an intuitive approach than by the evidence of
analysis, up to the first UNCTAD Conference, where coherent
43 For an examination of the different proposals in this field. see F. 0. Orrego, El control
de las e,7presa8 multinacionales, FORO INTERNACIONAL 106-128 (1973).
41 C. Lafer. sapra note 19.
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pressure emerged, including a number of important experiences
such as the nonaligned meetings, the Group of 77, or regional
actions, the Third World became more self-aware and acquired
a degree of ability to develop common and sustained positions."
Notwithstanding growing coordination, the Third World is still
far from constituting an homogenous group, nor is it capable of
pursuing unified policies. The different levels of development
within the Third World, in which the gap between the poor
and the prosperous developing countries is greater than the one
between the latter and developed countries, the often competitive
interests which Third World countries have as producers, and
the differences in political and cultural systems all tend to dis-
perse both action and strategy. This explains why, beyond broad
basic principles, the Third World has not yet reached an agree-
ment on how to organize and implement their specific claims,
except in given sectors.
It is a mistake to conclude from the foregoing, however, that
the diversity of the Third World is stronger than its tendencies
toward unification. This has been the erroneous judgment of
developed countries, which have followed the strategy of disre-
garding the claims of the Third World by either not discussing
problems or, when forced to discussion, ignoring the resulting
recommendations, confident that 1) elements of disagreement
among Third World states would reduce the effectiveness of their
claims, and 2) that bilateral or regional agreements would always
be possible to cope with the specific problems involving the inter-
ests of developed countries. 5 Such a strategy can succeed in the
short-term, but will not be effective in the medium or long-term,
for the position of the Third World has become more radical as a
consequence of having failed to obtain satisfactory solutions with
regard to any of its basic claims. If, e.g., a comparison is drawn
between the first formulations before the General Assembly,
those before UNCTAD I, and those of more recent nonaligned
conferences, the evolution is clearly apparent. Similar trends are
also present in other areas, such as foreign investments or the
law of the sea.
Dissension in the Third World is real, but more real is the
clear understanding of the problems inherent in the international
economic system, and in particular, of the fact that the system
has only granted developing countries a peripheral role which
does not take their needs into account. This conviction has turned
" F. H. Paolillo, La Estrategia del tercer ,aundo: Apunte saobre la eolidaridad de Wa
paises en desarrollo en su lucha internacional por reivindicaciones econoinicas, ENSAYOS
Sosan DERECHO INTERNACIONAL ECONomico Volume II (F. 0. Vicuna ed.).
' The negative votes and abstentions of developed countries with regard to General Prin-
ciples and Special Principles in UNCTAD I is a sufficient demonstration of this point. See
charts in JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 252-253.
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into a common Third World philosophy and as such is applied in
all circumstances. This appreciation of common problems explains
a permanent conceptual unity which, even though still limited to
basic guidelines, is sufficiently strong to persevere despite dam-
age done to Third World unity by dissension and competition
among the developing countries.
Controlling Raw Materials
Until recently, the strategy of the Third World had empha-
sized the pressing of claims to obtain certain concessions from
developed countries. These claims were generally passive and
related to nondiscriminatory access to developed country markets
and to fair prices; Third World strategy did not utilize the devel-
oping countries' own economic potential to strengthen their
position in the international system. During the 1960's, as a
consequence of not having their formulations considered, the
development began what could be called active claims. This later
period is characterized by a Third World which has learned to
take advantage of its own strength, not relying any longer on
what developed countries might voluntarily concede, but adopt-
ing those measures considered appropriate to attain desired goals.
Recognizing that much of the economic wealth of the Third
World is in its raw materials, the active strategy naturally was
concentrated in securing their control. Factors such as the weight
of the Third World's enormous population and its impact on the
world political scene greatly helped this strategy to attain consid-
erable effectiveness. The major move of the Third World has
been to no longer allow free access by developed countries to its
raw materials on terms imposed under the classic economic
system. This decision was actually not the result of a previous
arrangement between Third World countries, but emerged spon-
taneously and simultaneously in different places. In some cases
this has been implemented by means of legislation regulating
foreign investments, in other cases, by means of ensuring state
participation, and, in extreme cases, by means of direct or in-
direct nationalization.4 6 In any event, it is clear that the present
access of developed countries to raw materials is subject to
many more conditions and controls than during the early post-
war period. This is a tendency which certainly will accelerate in
coming years.
Still more significant is the tendency of developing countries
to control the whole of the sources of supply of a given raw ma-
4e The list of expropriations and other measures that have affected American properties
abroad is a demonstration of this tendency. Between 1960 and 1971, 34 countries applied
measures of this kind: 9 in Latin America, 15 in Africa, 5 in the Middle East, and 5 in
Asia. See Report on Nationalization, Expropriation, and other Taking of U.S. and certain
Foreign Property since 1960, 11 INT'L LBGAL MAT. 84-118 (1972).
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terial by means of producers' agreements. Among the several
producers' agreements that have been concluded,' 7 certainly the
best known is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), which has taken advantage of the peculiar condi-
tions of the oil market-underproduction and overconsumption-
and has marked a turning point in the evolution of Third World
strategy. This development reveals the difference between the
period of passive claims and that of active claims. While in the
initial period OPEC strove for better prices and conditions of
exploitation through negotiations with multinational oil corpora-
tions,48 in the later period it has proceeded to independently im-
plement measures deemed appropriate for attaining its desired
goals. The result not only demonstrated the feasibility of regu-
lating production and increasing earnings, but also demonstrated
the economic vulnerability of developed countries.
The paradox arising from the experience with producers'
agreements is that they are also products of the classic economic
system, with its principles of freedom of competition, supply and
demand, and absence of restrictions. The only difference is that
in this instance, and perhaps for the first time, the dominant
position has been exercised by developing countries. The forma-
tion of a producers' agreement is equivalent to the creation of a
cartel, of the same kind which for years was organized by the
producers of industrial goods taking advantage of the absence
of international controls.49 Price increases are the result of an
unbalanced supply and demand, which does not differ from the
traditional techniques employed many times by developed coun-
tries. The discrimination in the access to product is also equiva-
lent to the traditional discrimination suffered by the exports of
the third world. The political utilization of the situation also
does not lack precedent. It is even possible to observe that the
overall results of the process are identical to those generated in
the classic system: the concentration of enormous amounts of
capital and wealth in the hands of the beneficiary having the
dominant position, 50 coupled with the gradual deterioration of
the position of the trading counterpart.
41 For a summary description of the principal producers agreements. see H. BACHMANN.
THs EX-NAL RELATtONS OF Lzss-DEvELOPD COUNTaS 252-253 (1968).
OFor a chronology of negotiations, see I. M. Paul, La Organizacion de Paises ExpOrta-
dares de Petroleo (OPEP), ENSAYOS SosRz DERECHO INTERNACIONAL ECONOMICO Volume II
(F. 0. Vicuna ed.).
49On cartels and other restrictive business practices, see Restrictive Business Practices in
Relation to the Trade and Development of Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.2/119
(1973).
w The World Bank has estimated that at a market price of $8 per barrel of oil, the
member countries of OPEC will reach an income of 85 billion dollars in 1974. This figure
is particularly impressive when contrasted with the total earnings of developing countries,
excluding oil countries, which reached only 47.4 billion dollars from exports of goods and
services. It has also been estimated that by 1980, the OPEC income could reach 150-200
billion dollars which would be equivalent to one-half of the present total exports of devel-
oped countries. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank),
Prospects for the Developing Countries, (Report No. 477, July, 1974).
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On the other hand, it is also curious to observe that the reac-
tions to this process, when practiced by raw materials producers,
are identical to those in the classic system, but the roles of the
parties are reversed. The goal of producing countries has been
to reach bilateral agreements with consumers, a technique which
allows the former to accrue major benefits.5l It should be noted
that this was the system prevailing until Bretton Woods, and to
a significant extent is still operating. In contrast, the countries
affected by the scheme have been forced to harmonize their ac-
tions for joint defense. This is a strategy for which unified action
has been difficult to achieve.5 2 At least in the specific sector cov-
ered by a producers' agreement, the Third World has learned
from developed countries how to obtain maximum benefits from
the classic system; and the developed countries are learning from
the Third World the strategy of pressing claims.
Although it is true that the impact of OPEC has to a large
extent been due to the particular characteristics of the oil mar-
ket and the energy structure of developed countries, the influ-
ence of the general strategy of the Third World should not be
underestimated. It is clearly possible that this experience will
be repeated in all those sectors in which the Third World controls
raw materials vital to developed country interests. As an ex-
ample, a few developing countries control all or a great percent-
age of the supply of bauxite, copper, tin, and natural rubber.5 3
The list could be lengthened since most developed countries are
net importers of minerals.51 It is also possible to foresee the
creation of intersectorial agreements between competing pro-
ducers of different raw materials. For example, a cartel of
copper and bauxite producers could control the market for all
major electrical conductors. Eventually, the scheme could cover
the spectrum of all raw materials.55
The control of raw materials by the Third World has funda-
mentally altered the operation of the classic economic system, for
51 An example of this tendency can be found in the warning given by the Oil Minister of
Saudi Arabia. Zaki Yamani, to Japan, about the serious problems which Japan could en-
counter if it sought a plan of common action with other consuming countries rather than
pursue a bilateral agreement. The Washington Post, January 29, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
"An example of this difficulty was the display of cautious attitudes of many participating
countries, particularly France, exhibited at the Washington Energy Conference held by the
U.S. Government on February 11-13, 1974. The Washington Post, February 14, 1974, at 6.
col. 1.
43A conference of the five major producers of bauxite, Guinea, Australia, Guyana, Ja-
maica, and Surinam, was convened by Guinea in February, 1974. Four countries control
80% of the world's copper supplies, and are organized in the Inter-Governmental Council
of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC). Two countries control 70% of the supply of the
world's tin, and four countries control one-half of the production of natural rubber. The
Washington Post, January 14, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
The United States has a deficit of 6 billion dollars a year in the import of minerals.
Id. It is estimated that in 1985, the United States will import all of its chromium, cobalt.
manganese, and tin, as well as high percentages of aluminum, iron, nickel, and other
minerals. AGENDA, snpra note 2, at 137.
53For an examination of the principal trends in this area, see AGENDA, supra note 2, at
13-14.
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it no longer assures free access to such products, one of the
basic objectives of the international division of labor. To the
same extent, the mobility of foreign investments has also been
affected. Therefore, the questioning of the classic system by
developing countries has had tangible results. In turn, such re-
sults have been possible because of a profound change of cir-
cumstances: raw materials which for many years were considered
inexhaustible, abundant and cheap, are now in short supply and
are consequently more expensive.
However, these recent developments are still far from offering
solutions to the many problems affecting developing countries.
At best, they involve a relative improvement in the specfic area
of raw materials pricing. Even this benefit is problematic, for as
the abuse by developed countries of the classic system generated
phenomena that now are beginning to affect them adversely, an
overcapitalization upon the present situation by developing coun-
tries could lead to counter-productive effects, an example of
which would be a world recession provoked by the price of oil.
The pressure from the Third World has been sufficiently sus-
tained and intense in order to create conditions appropriate for
consideration of reorganization of the international economic sys-
tem on grounds that will respond to the legitimate needs of both
developing and developed countries. Also, this pressure, and in
particular the energy crisis, has put developed countries in a
position to appreciate more clearly the inadequacies of the classic
system, which, together with the problem of MNCs, has demon-
strated that the situation has sufficiently matured for states to
proceed to reorganization of the international economic system.
6. The Outlines of a World Economic Crisis
The problems and tendencies examined above reveal that the
classic system is no longer capable of fulfilling the needs of
developed or developing countries. The former do not enjoy at
present the freedom of access to raw materials enjoyed in the
past and the prices of these raw materials have been increased.
The comparative advantage of producing industrial goods has, to
some extent, been diminished. A consequence of this is that the
international division of labor no longer necessarily determines
a permanent flow of wealth to developed countries, and a growing
amount of earnings must be used to buy the commodities of the
Third World. The nondiscriminatory access of industrial goods
to the international market has partially lost its effect as a net
generator of income. Also, many of the benefits of the classic
system tend to be concentrated in MNCs which, in many cases,
can no longer be entirely identified with the interests of their
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countries of origin. It would certainly be an exaggeration to state
that all of these results are presently felt generally or that they
are absolute, but it is nonetheless true that trends and practical
examples do point in this direction.
Developing countries certainly remain disadvantaged: partially
due to the inequitable structure inherited from the classic sys-
tem and to the fact that the improvement recently attained in
the prices of raw materials only satisfies one of the many prob-
lems affecting them. It is difficult to predict the degree of sta-
bility or permanence of even these improvements when the
enormous capacity for technological development of developed
countries is taken into consideration.
Therefore, a number of problems in need of solution are always
present. The most important of these problems are: the price of
industrial goods which developing countries must import,
the access of developing country production to developed mar-
kets, the restrictive practices of MNCs and state corporations,
the absence of international income redistribution coupled with
the tendency of developed countries to restrict bilateral and
multilateral aid, and what in general has been described as the
peripheral international role of developing countries.
These complex problems explain the many minor crises unfold-
ing within the international economic system, all of which are
manifestations of the general crisis underlying the entire process,
determined by the inadequacy of the principles of the classic
system as applied to contemporary reality. The response which
still prevails is to search for partial and ad hoc solutions with
regard to each individual crisis. For example, the problem of
MNCs is approached without any reference to the causes from
which it originates: or the energy crisis is approached by seeking
an agreement between producers and consumers in that specific
sector with no reference to its causes, which are more profound
and general and certainly exceed the framework of that individ-
ual sector.
This partial approach only aggravates the situation, and post-
pones a lasting solution. In fact, even if one assumes, as an
example, that a mutually satisfactory agreement is reached by
the parties involved in the energy crisis, it certainly does not
prevent the problem from arising repeatedly in other sectors.
Assurance of the prosperity of a limited number of producing
countries has little influence on the overall problem affecting the
Third World or on the producers of other raw materials. On the
other hand, sectorial agreements would always allow the control
by developed countries of the aggregate of sectors forming the
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international economic system, since, as indicated above, devel-
oping countries can only operate in the specific sector imposed
by their individual circumstance as a monoproducer. The problem
of equitable participation in the direction of the system would
not be solved: this is one of the basic needs determined by con-
temporary reality. A similar situation is found in the case of
"solutions" directed toward creation of bilateral agreements be-
tween developed countries and developing countries which pro-
duce vitally needed raw materials, in which the former offer to
industrialize the latter in return for a guaranteed supply 5 r The
contribution of such agreements to a general solution is nil. Even
should this scheme be carried to a regional scale, the same prob-
lems would still remain, with the aggravating factor that the
operational capacity of the Third World would be seriously im-
paired, for it would mean its division into blocks linked to one or
more developed countries on the top.
It is therefore appropriate to insist on a global arrangement,
particularly if regional solutions would prevent multi-regional,
sectorial, or inter-sectorial agreements of producers. The bilateral
or regional approach could perhaps be conceived of as a transitory
stage in the process leading to a global reorganization, for it
would be unrealistic to request that developing countries refrain
from any arrangement in the meantime, but the final objective
must necessarily be a global scheme. It is possible to conclude,
therefore, that since the crisis affecting the international eco-
nomic system is generalized, the solution must, as the sole
alternative to secure stability and permanence, be of an identi-
cal nature. This approach assumes that the international com-
munity is willing to search for rational solutions which exclude
the argument for the use of force and retaliation by developed
countries, an argument which is not improbable if peaceful
solutions are not found in the short-term, even though such
methods would mean the beginning of a similarly generalized
confrontation between developed and developing countries.
7. Towards the Concept of an Economic Heritage of Mankind
Any attempted reorganization must seek a solution to the re-
cently manifested problems of the interdependent international
community. The most basic need, of course, is to halt the devel-
oping countries' decline into progressive impoverishment while
developed countries increase their prosperity. This should be a
5 Japan has entered into several agreements with oil producing countries of the Middle
East which provide for the export of different industrial products. The Washington Post,
February 3, 1974, at A5, col. 1. France has concluded agreements with Libya which event.
ually may involve projects totalling up to 5 billion dollars. The Washington Post. February
15, 1974, at A26, col. 3.
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fundamental principle of peaceful social coexistence. In rescuing
the developing countries, a world economic system must accord
them equitable participation in that system.
The freedom of competition upon which the classic system
was based is incapable of securing balance between developed
and developing countries not because the principle as such is inap-
propriate, but because it has never been fully applied in practice.
To assure the existence of fair competition, the abolition of all
kinds of restrictive practices is initially required, but the classic
system did not do this. Competition also requires that a dominant
position not be abused, but in the classic system developed coun-
tries and MNCs used and abused their dominant position. Above
all, fair competition requires a special protection for those who,,
by virtue of their weakness, are not in a position to resist the
overwhelming economic power of developed countries. This dic-
tates preferential treatment and not formal legal equality. Fur-
thermore, competition requires two basic indispensable meas-
ures: 1) nondiscriminatory access to supplies and markets, to
secure equal opportunities, and 2) redistribution of income to
prevent concentration of economic power, and to guarantee a
basic income for low-income groups. These requirements, which
were not met under the classic system, must become the guide-
line for reorganization of the international economic system
within a generally competitive framework.
The resources and wealth of the international community can
no longer be considered or administered as the property of the
powerful; it is necessary to advance to a stage in which they are
conceived of as the economic heritage of mankind in which all
nations may have rights and also obligations within a framework
which recognizes the legitimate needs and aspirations of all
nations.5 7 This concept of the economic heritage of mankind
could be based on the following minimum standards and
principles:
(i) Nondiscriminatory Access. A principle of nondiscrimina-
tory access would secure for developed countries the raw ma-
terials necessary for their industries, but there would no longer
be "free" access. Instead, access would be based on equality of
opportunities, with due regard being paid to the availability of
commodities. Thereby, in addition to preventing the economic
abuse of supplier nations, future embargoes would also be pre-
vented. The developing countries would also be afforded non-
51 A precedent of great importance in this sense is the Declaration of Principles approved
by Resolution 2749 (XXV) of the U.N. General Assembly, declaring that the sea-bed and
ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is the "common heritage of mankind."
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discriminatory access to the markets of developed countries for
their production. This access, guaranteed within a scheme of
preferential treatment which would account for varying degrees
of development, would reasonably enable developing countries to
compete economically on an international scale. It would also be
necessary to develop a price balance scheme which would guar-
antee equitable treatment for all states.
(ii) Prevention of Adverse Effects. Restrictive practices of
MNCs and state corporations, governments, and others should be
prevented and punished regardless of whether they originate in
developed or developing countries. Such practices would be al-
lowed, however, if they were legitimate responses to a need for
economic protection of a country or a group of countries. Abuse
of a dominant position also would be prevented or punished.
More importantly, the above principles also would be directed
to prevent a given measure, even though legal, from resulting in
adverse effects for the economy of one, several, or all countries,
according to their economic capacity. Thus, e.g., if the exces-
sive price increase of a given product, not responding to a ma-
nipulation but to a situation of scarcity, would result in a strong
deterioration of the balance of payments of a country which can-
not reasonably afford it, the principle would operate to attempt
to solve the problem.5 8 However, it is necessary that the pro-
ducer should not be affected to an unreasonable degree. The same
function would be performed in cases of abnormal decrease in
prices, serious monetary fluctuations, or other circumstances
capable of having major impact on economic stability.
(iii) The Redistribution of International Income. The key
mechanism of a new economic system should be the redistribu-
tion of income in given proportions of the benefit obtained. As
indicated above, this is the only possible manner by which to
guarantee that there will not be an excessive concentration of
international economic power and that low income groups will
attain a minimum income. This is the best possible guarantee for
international stability and justice. Although trade preferences
involve some degree of redistribution, the amount is very small;
nor is international aid sufficient, even assuming that developed
countries would transfer 1% of their gross national product to
developing countries.
5 Figures from the World Bank indicate that in 1972. developing countries paid 900 mil-
lion dollars for their imports of oil; in 1973, the cost increased to 2.3 billion dollars; in
1974. it will reach 11.6 billion dollars; and it is estimated that in 1980. these figures may be
anywhere between 25-38 billion dollars. The impact of this situation on the balance of pay-
ments is enormous, since in 1970, the total foreign exchange receipts of developing coun-
tries. excluding oil exporting countries, only reached 66.9 billion dollars including all
exports of goods and services, official and private flows, transfer of payments, credit lines,
and special drawing rights. Supra "iote 51.
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It is therefore necessary to establish an international tax sys-
tem, which in an appropriate manner would tax the income de-
rived internationally and from other sources on a progressive
scale. 9 An international fund should be created to channel this
redistribution. This system would apply to all nations propor-
tionately, thus insuring that if great amounts of capital and
wealth would be concentrated in the hands of some developing
countries, the other developing countries would benefit from a
reasonable redistribution, which should at least cover excess
profits.60
(iv) Institutionalization. The application of all of these princi-
ples will require the creation of the necessary institutions for
their administration and supervision. However, there is no need
for enormous bureaucratic machinery. A body with a large ca-
pacity for verification and analysis, accompanied by a system of
adequate sanctions would be sufficient. States themselves would
report activities contrary to the principles of the system to an
administrative mechanism. A general obligation to disclose infor-
mation should be established, and the mechanism should be
granted the powers necessary to request and obtain such infor-
mation. None of these features would prevent the operation of a
broad procedure for consultation and negotiation between the
parties involved, although the creation of a mechanism for genu-
ine impartial settlement of economic disputes should also be
considered. Eventually, these institutions could be entrusted with
the function of verifying the compatibility of foreign investments
submitted to it with the principles mentioned above, particularly
with regard to the conditions of contracts. Qualifying invest-
ments would be granted either a guarantee of inexpropriability or
international insurance covering certain risks.
Many of these functions including that of income redistribu-
tion, could be performed by international organizations created
at Bretton Woods which would be reorganized in accordance with
the new international economic system, as well as other existing
agencies with the appropriate technical expertise. However, an
imperative for the proper functioning of the system is that devel-
oping countries be accorded equitable participation in the institu-
tional and decision-making mechanisms, for otherwise the system
will continue under the exclusive control of developed country
interests.
W For several proposals related to partial tax schemes, see J. W. Howe and M. Weiss,
Nvew Financial Resources for the Poor Countries. AGENDA, supra note 2, at 54-55.
60 The Shah of Iran has suggested that the income obtained by oil producing countries
which cannot be utilized in those countries, should be made available to an international
bank for aid to developing countries. Interview by DER SPIEGEL, reported in The Washington
Post. February 3, 1974, at Ci. col. 5.
GUIDELINES FOR MONETARY REFORM
Conclusion
The evolution of international society has a close relationship
to the past evolution of national societies. The industrial revolu-
tion of the Nineteenth Century, which generated enormous pros-
perity, also created strong social tensions as a result of the inade-
quate redistribution of income, the concentration of economic
power, and the lack of protection of the weaker sectors. The
only alternative to social chaos, violent confrontation, and re-
pression was the adoption of standards of social justice, protec-
tive legislation, social security and income redistribution. Those
states which chose the latter alternative advanced to even greater
levels of prosperity and stability. The present choices before in-
ternational society are similar. The concept of the economic heri-
tage of mankind represents a viable option for the introduction
of standards of international social justice into the world eco-
nomic system, not as an inflexible tool, but as a minimum and
mutually acceptable pattern for action. This proposal may strike
some readers as utopian, but in any case, it is preferable to ex-
periment than to risk the collapse of the present system, with
ominous consequences for the preservation of peace and world
order.

